In this work we study the Battle of the Coral Sea using a stochastic version of the salvo combat model. We begin by estimating the range of probable alternative results for the battle, given the forces employed; i.e., if the battle were to be "re-fought", how likely are outcomes other than what historically transpired? Our analysis suggests that a wide range of results was indeed possible, even without any change in forces on either side.
INTRODUCTION
In May 1942 the Japanese military was preparing to invade Port Moresby on the south shore of Papua New Guinea, from where they would have been able to threaten Allied ship movements northeast of Australia. To protect their invasion forces from interference, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) dispatched a task force built around two aircraft carriers (CVs). The United States Navy (USN) responded to this threat by sending two CVs of its own into the area. After some initial skirmishes involving secondary forces, the opposing carrier groups engaged in battle on 8 May 1942. Each side launched a wave of air strikes against the other at roughly the same time. As a result of these attacks the IJN carrier Shokaku suffered heavy damage and was put out of action, while the Zuikaku was unharmed. The losses on the USN side were somewhat greater, with the Yorktown being temporarily disabled and the Lexington eventually sinking. Tactically therefore the battle could be considered a USN defeat; strategically however it was an Allied victory because it saved Port Moresby from Japanese invasion (Lundstrom, 1984: 278) .
The Battle of the Coral Sea is an interesting one for study because of both its importance and its simplicity. It was important not only because it marked the first rebuff of IJN advances, but also because it was the world's first carrier duel: both sides' attacks were executed by carrier aircraft, while the ships themselves never sighted the enemy. It was relatively simple in that the main battle involved only a single carrier force and a single air strike for each side.
In this paper we analyze the battle of 8 May 1942 using a stochastic version (Armstrong, 2005) of the salvo combat model developed by Hughes (1995) . Our discussion begins in the next section with a brief review of the salvo model. We then use two versions of this model to "re-fight" the battle as it originally occurred. The first version is an aggregated approach that uses squadrons of aircraft as the unit of analysis;
we follow that with a higher-resolution version involving individual aircraft. In both cases our objective is to determine what ranges of ship losses could reasonably have resulted from the battle, given the historical match-up of forces. In other words, we want to know whether the outcome of the battle could have been much different if either side
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Battle of the Coral Sea MOR 05-12 3 had been slightly "luckier". Our analysis indicates that this was indeed the case, with wide ranges of results for each side being probable.
In subsequent sections of the paper we consider several alternative history or "what-if" scenarios to address the following questions:
 What if the USN CVs had traveled separately instead of sailing in a single task force?
 What if the USN had committed a third CV to the battle?
 What if the USN had been equipped with more fighter aircraft but fewer dive bombers or torpedo bombers?
 What if the USN air defense system had been better coordinated and more experienced in the use of radar and combat air patrol tactics?
To study each of these alternatives, we adjust the inputs to our model to reflect the assumed change in forces, and then examine the model outputs to determine the likely impact of that change. Our analysis suggests that having an extra CV or dispersing the carriers into separate task forces would have been mostly beneficial to the USN. The USN would also have benefited from the effects of a better-coordinated air defense, but it appears this benefit would have been insignificant by itself. On the other hand, changing the aircraft mix carried to include a larger proportion of fighters would have provided a net disadvantage for the USN, as the slight improvement in defense would have been offset by a large decrease in offensive power. Overall these results can be interpreted as supporting the proposition (Hughes, 2001: 107) that in 1942 the offense was inherently superior to the defense in naval warfare. Our paper concludes with a discussion of our results and of the principle limitations of our method of analysis. An appendix describes the details of our data and modeling assumptions.
SALVO COMBAT MODELS
The salvo combat model was developed by Hughes (1995) primarily to model missile combat between modern warships, although it has also been used to study aircraft carrier battles (see e.g. Hughes, 2000: 90-116; Johns et al, 2001: 23-28) . In this model, combat is assumed to proceed as follows:
 The ships on our side fire a salvo (wave) of offensive anti-shipping missiles at the opposing force. Simultaneously, the opposing force fires their own anti-shipping missiles at our ships;
 Each side uses its missile defense systems to attempt the interception and destruction of as many incoming anti-shipping missiles as possible;
 Any anti-shipping missiles that are not intercepted then strike their targets and cause damage. Ships that take sufficient damage become firepower kills: they are knockedout of the battle, though not necessarily sunk.
The output of this model is an estimate of the number of surviving ships for each side after one exchange of salvos. The interested reader is referred to Hughes (1995) for a more detailed description of the model and its assumptions.
One limitation of the basic salvo model is its deterministic nature: it does not take into account the inherent variability or randomness in combat, e.g. the uncertainty of whether a particular missile will or will not hit its target. The more recent work by Armstrong (2005) incorporates this variability in a relatively simple way so as to derive a Note that these outputs are produced using analytical equations, rather than the more conventional method of discrete event simulation.
ANALYSIS OF THE HISTORICAL SITUATION
In this section we make use of the stochastic form of the salvo combat model to study the Battle of the Coral Sea as it was actually fought; that is, without making any change to the forces or tactics used by either side. We perform our analysis twice: once at a relatively low resolution, similar in style to that done by Hughes (2000), and then again at a higher resolution that is more in line with the analysis of Johns et al (2001) . By using two versions of the model, each with its own data set, we obtain a degree of assurance that our results are not merely artifacts of any particular modeling choice.
Analysis at the Squadron Level
Our first analysis is done with an aggregated treatment of the battle, in which squadrons (typically composed of about 18 aircraft each) are the basic unit of combat power. In terms of the salvo model, we treat each squadron of dive bombers or torpedo bombers as being equivalent to one offensive "missile", which if not intercepted has a probability of successfully attacking the enemy force. We likewise treat each fighter squadron as if it were a defensive "missile" that has a probability of successfully intercepting one attacking squadron. Bomber squadrons that are not intercepted are assumed to attack and cause a variable loss that averages one enemy CV. More of interest to us here are the distributions of possible results around these means, as illustrated for the USN in Figure 1 . This histogram shows, for example, a 54% probability that the USN could lose the use of both its CVs. Another way to describe the range of "likely" results is with a prediction interval for the losses on each side: if we were to re-fight this battle repeatedly using the same probabilities, a 90% prediction interval is the range in which we would expect the losses to fall 90% of the time.
According to our model this interval runs from 0 to 2 ships for both sides, suggesting that "anything was possible", even without changes in how the battle was fought (as in e.g., a surprise attack by one side). The second version of our study is more detailed in that we model individual attack aircraft as being equivalent to offensive missiles. We likewise treat each fighter aircraft as if it were a defensive missile that has a probability of successfully intercepting one attacking bomber. Attack aircraft that are not intercepted are assumed to attack the enemy task force and cause a variable amount of damage.
Analysis at the Aircraft Level
Most of the data for this more detailed treatment are derived from the historical account provided by Lundstrom (1984) : the actual number of fighter aircraft on each carrier, the number of bomb hits achieved, etc. We treat the actual battle result as being the "average" outcome, and then work backwards to derive the inputs needed by the model. The parameters for the effect of weapon hits on warships, however, are obtained from two studies of bomb and torpedo damage to ships throughout World War II: one by
Beall and one by Humphrey, both as reported in Hughes (2000: 157) . The resulting model inputs are shown in Table 2 ; the appendix describes the details of their derivation. In comparing these aircraft level results to those from the squadron version of our model, we can see that both versions provide similar estimates of the mean outcomes of the battle, but they differ noticeably in their estimates of the variability of these Taken together, the two versions of the model suggest that the results of the original battle could easily have turned out quite differently even without any change in the forces employed. Thus for example it appears that there was a real danger that both USN carriers could have been put out of action, in which case the Japanese military presumably would have carried out its planned invasion of Port Moresby. We believe that the similarity of the results from these two analysis approaches also provides some assurance that our modeling approach is reasonable overall.
ALTERNATIVE SCENARIOS
We now turn our attention to several alternative history or "what-if" scenarios in which we assume that the US force had differed in some way from its historical form. In each scenario we adjust the inputs to our pair of models to reflect this difference, and Tables 3 and 4 .
Dispersed USN carriers
What if the US carriers had been traveling separately, instead of sailing together?
This change in tactical dispositions could easily have been ordered by the US force commander, Admiral Fletcher, and our study of it here reflects a debate about the advantages of massing versus dispersal (Hughes, 2000: 96) . By traveling together the CVs were able to share their fighter cover and escorts, but this also meant that the discovery of one led to an attack on both. By contrast, at the later Battle of Midway the Yorktown was traveling apart from the other CVs; when it was discovered by the IJN it was overwhelmed and sunk, but the other USN carriers remained unspotted and thus unharmed (Lundstrom, 1984: 323 ).
Herein we suppose that the USN CVs had been moderately far apart: close enough that their strikes against the IJN could still be coordinated, but dispersed enough that their air defenses could be considered independent, so that the IJN attack would have focused on a single CV and missed the other one completely. As we did with the historical scenario in the previous section, we study this alternative scenario with both versions of our model and then compare the results.
The second row of numbers in Table 3 10 on average 0.54 CVs more than they lose. The aircraft level analysis in Table 4 puts both the mean and the prediction interval for USN losses at 1.00 CV, i.e. the one exposed US CV is almost always lost.
These figures indicate that separation of their CVs would have given the USN significant benefits on defense, by lowering their average loss and also by making their losses less variable and so in some sense less "risky". The main downside to this tactic is that it condemns one of the CVs to destruction, whereas sailing together gives both ships a small chance of survival.
Extra Carriers For The USN
What if the USN had sent an additional carrier to fight in the Coral Sea? Two
CVs were involved in the Doolittle raid on Tokyo; a decision to send one or both of these vessels to the Coral Sea could presumably have been made by fleet headquarters, though obviously at the cost of canceling the Tokyo raid.
Let us suppose that the USN had sent 3 CVs to the Coral Sea instead of 2, but that the battle had otherwise been fought in its original form (e.g. the carriers traveled all together, not dispersed as in the previous scenario). In this case our squadron level analysis shows the USN losses actually increasing slightly to 1.67 CVs on average, with the 90% prediction interval at 0.00 to 3.00 ships. IJN losses in this version show a larger increase, with an average loss of 1.82 ships and a prediction interval of 0.52 to 2.00 ships.
The aircraft level analysis on the other hand yields a slightly lower mean USN loss of 1.57 CVs within a prediction interval of 1.17 to 1.98, while the IJN losses average 1.98
ships within a prediction interval of 1.84 to 2.00 ships lost. These figures are shown in the third line of Tables 3 and 4 . have put more of their ships at risk.
We can carry this investigation a step further by estimating the number of CVs required to essentially guarantee a USN "success". That is:
 How many USN carriers would have been needed to provide at least a 95% probability of a "perfect" offense, i.e. IJN losses = 2 CVs?
 How many USN carriers would have been needed to provide at least a 95% probability of a "perfect" defense, i.e. USN losses = 0 CVs?
First consider the offense. With either the squadron version or the aircraft version of our model, we find that the USN can obtain a 95% probability of achieving the destruction of both IJN carriers by deploying a total of 4 CVs to the battle. This was historically achievable, though it would have meant canceling the Doolittle raid and deploying the entire Pacific carrier force to this one region. Defensive success turns out to be much harder to ensure: to obtain a 95% probability of zero losses, the USN needs a total of 21 CVs according to the squadron model, or 11 CVs according to the aircraft model. Forces of this size were simply not available to the USN in 1942.
These results indicate that while the USN could probably have ensured the destruction of the IJN force by deploying more CVs into the region, they would not have been able to guarantee much about their own survival. (Hughes, 2000: 107) . This ongoing trend gave the carrier air wings a progressively stronger air defense capability, but of necessity it also meant that they contained fewer attack aircraft than they otherwise might have.
More Fighters And Fewer Bombers
To model this scenario we increase the number of fighter aircraft or squadrons on each USN CV to roughly 1944 levels, so that they represent 65% of the total aircraft carried. We correspondingly reduce the number of attack aircraft to be 35% of the total, so that on a net basis each CV still has the same total number of aircraft. With the Based upon these numbers, a switch to an aircraft mix containing more fighters but fewer bombers would have left the USN worse-off overall. The slight improvement in defense would not have been enough to make up for the large drop in offensive power.
With more CVs on each side surviving the initial exchange of air strikes, it seems likely 13 that a second round of air strikes would have followed in which the weakened USN would probably have been at a significant disadvantage.
Better Air Defense Coordination
In 1942 
Extra Carriers, More Fighters, And Better Air Defenses
In the previous three subsections we considered the impact of changes in the USN force made one at a time; next we examine the impact of making all three changes at It is clear that the USN gains a large advantage from these simultaneous changes, as the combined effect of the increases in both the number and effectiveness of their fighters allows the USN defense to hold back the bulk of the IJN attack, just as they did at the later Battle of the Philippine Sea. The initial exchange of air strikes would likely cause minimal damage to the US force and major (but not complete) losses to the IJN, so that the USN could expect to have a very large advantage in any follow-up air strikes. In this paper we made use of the stochastic salvo model of Armstrong (2005) to study the Battle of the Coral Sea, both in historical form and in several alternative or "what-if" scenarios. We analyzed each scenario in two ways: a lower-resolution study in which air power was aggregated into squadrons, and a higher-resolution study in which air power was broken down to the individual aircraft. We found that these two different levels of analysis tended to provide similar estimates for the average number of carriers lost by each side, but that the squadron-level study suggested a much wider range and standard deviation for these losses.
CONCLUSIONS & LIMITATIONS
For the base case involving the historical order of battle, our analysis indicated that the battle could easily have had a wide range of outcomes, simply by having one side be slightly more or less "lucky" in its performance. For the alternative history scenarios that we subsequently considered, our findings can be summarized as follows: The validity of these results is limited of course to the extent that our models and their inputs together provide reasonable representations of World War II carrier air battles. The stochastic salvo model we used herein to model naval air strikes was originally developed to model combat involving missiles. One difference between missiles and aircraft is that the latter are inherently more flexible. For example, although fighter aircraft mostly flew combat air patrol in defense of their carriers, they also performed close escort missions to protect their attack aircraft. In a similar manner, USN dive bombers not only attacked enemy shipping but also flew scouting missions to locate enemy targets and even provided secondary air defense of their fleet. Our work implicitly assumed that the proportion of aircraft assigned to these "non-standard" roles was fixed at the levels historically used, whereas a more detailed study might include this mission flexibility as another decision variable.
Another difference between aircraft and missiles is that aircraft attacks are more complex sets of events. Our study assumed that attack aircraft that were not shot down were able to attempt attacks against ships, while those shot down did not. In reality, fighter interception of an attacking bomber could sometimes distract the attacker enough to ruin its aim, even if it managed to avoid being shot down. On the other hand, even aircraft that were shot down sometimes had time to launch their weapons beforehand. A more definitive model for World War II carrier battles should presumably include these kinds of second-order effects, but this was beyond the scope of our work herein. [
Given just this one equation, we need to make some arbitrary though reasonable choices to obtain 3 parameters. First we choose the mean damage per successful squadron attack to be E[v]= 1 ship, so that 1 non-intercepted attack squadron on average achieves a firepower kill on 1 CV. We then set the standard deviation of damage to be one third of this value, i.e. 1/3=0.3333; this amount makes the variation in damage relatively large but keeps the likelihood of a spurious negative value relatively small, as then the mean loss is 3 standard deviations above zero. Some numerical experimentation suggests that our results are not very sensitive to the size of this standard deviation. Lundstrum, 1984: 221) .
To obtain the probabilities of success, we assume that the historical results of the battle were "average" and then work backwards to determine what the corresponding model parameters would be. Note that this assumption ignores the likelihood that the historical results were different from their "true" underlying means, and so our prediction intervals presumably underestimate the variation in probable results.
Not all bomber aircraft actually participated in the attack: some did not fly due to mechanical problems, some flew scouting missions, and some were sent on the strike but got lost along the way. To model this we calculate probability p as the ratio of aircraft arriving in the target area to aircraft carried. For the USN, 47 attack aircraft made it to the target area, thus p=47/94=0.5000 (Lundstrum, 1984: pp 225-226, 236, 242) . For the IJN the corresponding calculation is p=51/66=0.7727 (Lundstrum, 1984: pp 224, 242) .
Next consider the air defense. In the USN strike, 2 attack aircraft were shot down by the IJN (Lundstrum, 1984: 243) , thus the probability of a successful intercept (shoot down) was pz=2/41=0.04878 per IJN fighter. The calculation for the USN defense is py=12/34=0.3529. These calculations implicitly assume that these attack aircraft were shot down only by fighters (rather than by other aircraft types or the defending ships),
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and that these shoot-downs all occurred before the aircraft had a chance to launch their ordinance (rather than as they withdrew afterwards). Losses of fighter aircraft are ignored in our model.
A total of 3 hits were achieved against the IJN CVs; dividing this by the 47-2=45
USN attack aircraft that arrived in the target area and were not shot down gives 3/45=0.06667 ship hits per surviving USN attacker (Lundstrum, 1984: 231, 238) . The equivalent calculation for the IJN attack divides 5 hits by 51-12=39 attackers and so gives 5/39=0.1282 hits per surviving IJN attacker (Lundstrum, 1984: 253, 256-258) .
To calculate the number of ships lost per hit, we used estimates described by Hughes (2000: 157) that were developed by Beall and by Humphrey based on 176
warships that were damaged during World War II; each study estimated the amount of ordinance required to achieve a firepower kill for target ships of different tonnage. For aircraft bombs, the number of thousand pound bomb equivalent (TPBE) hits required to achieve firepower kills were:
 Beall: 1.7 hits for a 15000 ton ship, 2.5 hits for a 45000 ton ship; and,  Humphrey: 1.6 hits for 15000 tons, 2.7 hits for 45000 tons.
Averaging these two sets of estimates gives 1.65 hits for a ship of 15000 tons and 2.6 hits for one of 45000 tons. By assuming a linear relationship within this range, we derive the following equation. We followed a similar process for torpedo damage.
 Beall: 1.4 hits for 15000 tons, 2.0 hits for 45000 tons; and, Since our model aggregates all of the attack aircraft on each side, we convert specific weaponry into TPBE and then compute a weighted average value for each side.
For the USN we proceed as follows. (a) The some battles had important differences in form, e.g. a surprise strike by one side; (b) Between the first and last battle there were already notable changes in tactics and to some extent technology, at least by the USN; and, (c) There were differences in historical data quality between battles. 
